Final Projects

Michael Monteiro: “An Implementation and Analysis of the Yokoo Protocol”

Qicheng Ma: “An Empirical Analysis of Online Mechanisms for a Single Reusable Good”

Alfred Galichon: “Consolidation- v. False-name Proofness in Combinatorial Auctions”

Haoqi Zhang & Willis Ho: “The Interaction Between Revenue and Efficiency in Truthful Envy-free Auctions”

Yan-Cheng Chang: “A Study on Privacy-Preserving Auctions”

Victor Shnayder & Eric Budish: “Continuous Combinatorial Exchange with an Application to Course-Swapping Aftermarkets”

Laura Serban & Florin Constantin: “The Sensitivity of Competitive Auctions to Prior Information”

Geoffrey Mainland: “Inaccurate Priors and Quantized Preferences in Automatically Generated Mechanisms”

Danny Goodman: “Monte Carlo Simulation of Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods”

David Hammer & Jonathan McPhie: “BitMart: A Set of Auction-Based Protocols for Peer-to-Peer File Exchanges”

Gregory Valiant: “Cost of Selfishness”

Shaili Jain: “Centralized Network Formation with Self-Interested Agents”

Ilan Lobel: “An Empirical Study of the Lavi-Nisan Online Auction”

Abe Othman: “Revenue-Maximizing Online Auctions”

Kang-Xing Jin and Aditya Sanghvi: “Beyond AdWords: Truthful Contingent-Payment Mechanisms”

Shien Jin Ong: “Minimizing Loss of Privacy in Mechanism Design”

Pavithra Harsha: “Activity Rule of Budget Constrained Bidders”

Jon Bennett: “Deceit in Electronic Auctions: The Devil is in the Externalities”

Mohamed Mostagir: “On the Tradeoff between Complexity and Accuracy in Preference Elicitation”